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ANOTHER NEW TORT?
Paul A. Leidy*

D URING

the past two years there have come suggestions of at
least two new torts: intentional infliction of mental suffering,1
and radio defamation. 2 The ease with which the decision in Baxter v.
Ford Motor Company 3 has caught on, especially with legal scholars
and with at least one Am.etjcan court,<t suggests that we may soon have
to add a third. This one, however, will be more difficult to label, for
the writers who applaud the result seem to be in almost complete disagreement as to the principle of the case; there are already several
explanations and justifications for the liability imposed upon the defendant automobile manufacturer by ,the Supreme Court; of Washington; and the court itself, apparently, had considerable difficulty m
determining just what sort of liability it had imposed.

I
THE FACTS OF THE BA.'\'.TER CASE

In its own right the case is a most interesting one. Plaintiff purchased a Ford car from defendant local dealer, who had, in turn,
bought it from defendant manufacturer. Plaintiff was severely injured
when a small pebble, thrown up by a passing car, struck his windshield,

* Professor of Law and Secretary of the Law School, University of Michigan;
A.B., M.A., J.D., Michigan.-Ed.
1 Prosser, ''Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort," 37 M1cH.
L. REv. 874 (1939).
2 Warner, "Defamation by Radio--A New Tort," 4 FEo. CoMMUN. B. J. 30
(1939).
3 168 Wash. 456, 12 P. (2d) 409, 15 P. (2d) n18, 88 A. L. R. 521 at 527
(1932). The case has been commented upon in many law reviews. See, for example,·
18 Co&N. L. Q. 445 (1933); 46 HARV. L. REV. 161 (1932); 81 UN1v. PA. L. REV.
94 (1932); 7 RocKY MT. L. REV. 221 (1935); 7 WAsH. L. REv. 351 (1932);
22 WAsH. UN1v. L. Q. 406 (1937). Professor Bohlen, "Fifty Years of Torts," 50
HARV. L. REV. 725, 1225 at 1234, note 14 (1937), refers to the case in this fashion:
"A curi9us effect of the complete rejection of contractual privity as a condition necessary to liability is found in ••• Baxter v. Ford Motor Company••••" And Professor
Feezer, "Manufacturer's Liability for Injuries Caused by his Products: Defective Automobiles," 37 M1cH. L. REV. l (1938), discusses the Baxter case at length. See also,
Harper and McNeeley, "A Synthesis of the Law of Misrepresentation," 22 MmN.
L. REV. 938 at 969 (1938). This list is probably not e.-tliaustive.
4The Supreme Court of Michigan. Two recent Michigan cases will be discussed
later.
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and shattered it, so that a small fragment of glass penetrated his eye.
The manufacturer had supplied the dealer with some catalogs and
literature describing the new Triplex "shatter-proof'' glass with which
the new models were equipped. This literature contained such statements as these:
"All of the new Ford cars have a Triplex shatter-proof glass
windshield-so made that it. will not :fly or shatter under the
hardest impact. This is an important safety factor because it eliminates the dangers of flying glass-.:.._the cause of most of the injuries
in automobile accidents.":,
The deale~ undoubtedly used this literature in his "sales talk." And, as
there were allegations that both defendants had made representations
to the purchaser about the quality of the new windshields, we must
assume that plaintiff's attorneys were charging the Ford Motor Company with misrepresenting its product through the publication and
distribution of the catalogs and sales literature.
Both the dealer and the manufacturer secured judgments in the
trial court; the supreme court affirmed the judgment as to the dealer,
but reversed as to the manufacturer. The dealer's contract with the
purchaser contained a clause which, the court held, relieved him of
any liability:
"It is further agreed that no warranty, either express or implied is made by the dealer under this order or otherwise covering said car."
The parol evidence rule, it was said, prevented the admission of the
sales literature as against the immediate vendor. The local dealer, who,
by reason of his actual presence and the possibility of current verbal
persuasion, was in a position directly to induce the purchase, was relieved of liability because of the presence of a two or three line hedge
in the printed contract. What of the remote vendor, whose influence
was limited to the more indirect persuasion of billboard and magazine
advertising, or that resulting from the sales literature?
As the action was said to be one for "damages for breach of warranty," defendant manufacturer contended that, in the absence of
privity, neither express nor implied warranty could be found as to him;
therefore, he argued, the literature could not properly be admitted in
evidence in the_ action against him. The trial court apparently agreed
with him; the supreme court did not; and the case went back for a new
trial as to the manufacturer.
5

Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456 at 459, 12 P. (2d) 409 (1932).
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As the facts have apparently been misunderstood by some commentators, it seems ~se to point out two facts about this case. In the
:first place, there was no showing of negligence O on the part of the
Ford Motor Company either as to the manufacture of the windshield
or as to the statements made about the quality of the new laminated
glass. Readers will no doubt remember the public tests to which the
windshields were subjected. And there is no reason to doubt-on the
contrary, investigation will show-that the glass was subjected to
every conceivable laboratory test before it was adopted and advertised. Occasionally it has been argued 7 that modern business practices
suggest the justice of "responsibility through," from the maker to the
ultimate vendee-user, in these defective chattel cases. Factual surveys
are employed to press this point. We venture the suggestion that a
similar survey will show that new and more expensive accessories are
not installed on modern motor cars without severe tests by both the
patentee and the motor car manufacturer. Secondly, this was not a case,
as some commentators apparently assume, in which a manufacturer
promised to equip a car with the new type of laminated glass windshield, and then actually equipped this car with the old-fashioned ordinary glass shield.
Laboratory tests, and road tests, had apparently convinced the glass
industry and the motor car manufacturers that a "shatter-proof'' glass
had been found. We may assume that they had reasonable grounds for
that belief, and, hence, were not negligent. Our case, then, resolves
itself to this: A manufacturer, with no wrongful intent, without negligence, either in the manufacture of the product or in the statements of
quality advertised, and believing that his new cars were equipped with
a. glass which was shatter-proof,-ra equips his car with a new and better
windshield, which, he states, will not shatter. On this occasion, however,
it does shatter. Shall the defendant be liable to the purchaser who,
6 Nowhere, in any of the opinions rendered in this case [and there were three:
the original, cited above; the per curiam opinion, 168 Wash. 465; and the oi,inion
rendered on second appeal, 179 Wash. 123, 35 P. (zd) IOgo (1934) J is there any
suggestion that there were allegations or proof of negligence, Nor was there any sug•
gestion that the court was limiting liability to actors guilty of intentional wrong or
negligence.
1 Bogert and Fink, "Business Practice Regarding Warranties in the Sale of Goods,"
25 ILL, L. REV. 400 (1930), quoted approvingly by Professor Feezer, "Manufacturer's
Liability for Injuries Caused by his Product: Defective Automobiles," 37 MtcH. L.
REV. l at 3 (1938).
711 If this assumption is unfairly favorable to the defendant manufacturer, it must
be remembered that the court's decision is broad enough to cover a case involving the
situation here assumed. See note 6, supra.
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while driving along a country road, loses an eye as a result of the
impact of a small pebble thrown up by a passing car?

II
THE REASONING OF THE

CouRT

The opinion states that the action is one "for damages for breach
of warranty." Two cases 8 are cited, both of them usually regarded as
negligence cases, though in one of them, Mazetti v. Armour & Co.,
the Washington court had suggested liability upon an implied warranty
theory. The Mazetti case involved a negligent food packer who was
held liable to the proprietor of a restaurant who suffered a loss of
business after having served, to a patron, some unwholesome canned
tongue packed by the defendant. This case, a typical "food case," is
often cited by those who are discussing a well-recognized exception
to the general rule of non-liability of a negligent manufacturer to
remote vendees.9 In the Mazetti case, negligence was alleged; there
is nothing in the opinion to suggest that it was not proved; two of the
four headnotes refer, speciiically, to liability for negligence; and
Thomas v. Winchester,1° a leading case for the exception just noted,
is cited to sustain "this exception." True, as already suggested, the court
does talk of implied warranties; so also did it talk of liability for
violation of pure food statutes. But the court also used the familiar language of negligence. ".\7itness this statement:
"It seems that the test ... should .•• rest . • . in answering the
question whether there has been a damage which may be justly
attributed to the negligence or a breach of duty on the part of the
one who had power and whose duty it was to prevent the wrong." 11
The other case cited by the court in the Baxter opinion was Thomas
v. Winchester, the famous mislabelled drug case in which the New
York court said:
"the distinction is recognized between an act of negligence imminently dangerous to the lives of others, and one that is not so.
In the former case, the party guilty of the negligence is liable to
8 Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 P. 633, 48 L. R. A. (N. S.)
213 (1913); and Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N. Y. 397, 57 Am. Dec. 455 (1852).
9 The now famous "rule" of Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 152
Eng. Rep. 402 (1842).
10 6 N. Y. 397, 57 Am. Dec. 455 (1852).
11 Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622 at 626, 135 P. 633 (1913).
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the party injured, whether there be a contract between them or
not; in the latter, the negligent party is liable only to the party
with whom he contracted•.••" 12
This is the case to which Justice Cardozo referred when, in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,13 he said:
'CW'e hold, then, that the principle of Thomas v. Winchester
is not limited to poisons, explosives, and things of like nature, to
things which in their normal operation are implements of destruction. If the nature of the thing is such that it is reasonably certain
to place life and limb in peril when negligently made, it is then
a thing of danger."
Such things, it may be assumed, are to be added to the list of articles
of a "noxious or dangerous" kind, referred to in Mazetti v. Armour
&Co.
At this point, then, the situation was as follows: Liability was imposed in an action for damages for breach of warranty. Two cases were
cited by the court; one was an out-and-out negligence case, the other
a "food case" in which the court had talked negligence, implied warranty, and violation of pure food statutes. And both of the cited cases
are used, quite commonly, to illustrate well-recognized exceptions to
the so-called "general rule of non-liability" for negligence in the manufacture of a chattel.
Eventually, after a new trial, the Baxter case again reached the
Supreme Court of Washington.14 This time the court affirmed a judgment entered "upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the
plaintiff, in an action for damages for breach of warranty." The court
pointed out that, on a former appeal "a majority of the court'' had
adhered to its earlier opinion, and added, "At least, a majority of the
court still consider the former opinion as in accord with the principles
of common law. . .•" Defendant's attorneys argued that the plaintiff
could not have bought a better windshield than that used in the car
which he purchased. In disposing of this argument the court said that
this fact, if proved, would be wholly immaterial, for
"it was the duty of appellant to know that the representations
made to purchasers were true. Otherwise, it should not have made
them. If a person states as true material facts susceptible of knowledge to one who relies and acts thereon to his injury, if the repreThomas v. Winchester, 6 N. Y. 397 at 410.
217 N. Y. 382 at 389, 111 N. E. 1050 (1916) (italics added).
14 179 Wash. 123, 35 P. (2d) 1090 (1934).
12

18

1940}
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sentations are false, it is immaterial that he did not know that they
were false, or that he believed them to be true." 15
And this time, of course, the court cited, in support of this conclusion,
cases involving fraud and deceit.16 On this point, and at this time, it is
enough to remind ourselves that Professor Bohlen has already pointed
out that courts which impose liability in these "as-of-his-own-knowledge" cases, in actions of fraud and deceit, are actually enriching the
field of warranty. We quote, from his valuable article,1'' two pertinent
excerpts:

"If it be a tort liability at all, and not a liability based solely upon
an extension of the idea of warranty, it is substantially a liability
without fault. . . . If the courts were to recognize the fact that
they are enriching the law of warranty by treating such a statement
as a warranty, it is clear that only those who are party to a sale or
other contract induced by the warranty would be held liable
thereon."
Therefore, after two appeals and a rehearing, we find a non-negligent
manufacturer held liable to a remote vendee for physical injuries in a
situation where
(a) the action was for "damages for breach of warranty'';
(b) the cases cited, in the :first opinion, were essentially "negligence" cases; and,
( c) on final appeal, the court justified its former judgment by
referring to a principle which has been adopted in some jurisdictions in actions for damages for fraud and deceit.

III
PossIBLE LEGAL THEORIES
But the court is not alone in its rather unusual admixture of legal
principles. One would have some difficulty in finding a case which has
produced as many "justifications" as has this Baxter case. Many commentators believe that the result reached was a most desirable one;
they differ widely when they attempt to pigeonhole the case or label the
179 Wash. 123 at 128.
Pratt v. Thompson, 133 Wash. 218, 233 P. 637 (1925); and Jacquot v.
F:irmers' Straw Gas Producer Co., 140 Wash. 482, 249 P. 984 (1926).
17 Bohlen, "Misrepresentation as Deceit, Negligence, or Warranty," 42 HARV.
L. REV. 733 at 737, 743 (1929).
15
16
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"principle" of Baxter 'V. Ford Motor Company. As the author of a
:ecent law review comment points out, it has been said that the case
1s one
(a)
(b)
(c)
( d)
( e)
(£)
(g)

of fraud and deceit,18
falling within an extension to the rule of MacPherson 'V. Bttick,10
fallingwithin the rule of the MacPherson case,2°
based upon implied warranty principles,21
based upon express warranty principles,22
based upon a unilateral contract theory,23
basedupona tort-on-warranty theory.24

And then the writer slyly adds his suggestion, that the case was an
"action of negligent advertising." 26
16 81 U:Niv. PA, L. Rmr. 94 (193:z); 18 CoRN. L. Q. 445 at 449 (1933):
''With the requirement of scienter thus practically removed, the instant case might easily
have been placed on the modern theory of deceit••••" Note, however, the comment in
7 WASH. L. REV. 351 at 353 (193:z), where the author, citing relatively recent
Washington cases, says: "As the Washington court has phrased it, 'it must appear that the
maker [ of the representations] knew them to be false or made them recklessly as facts
without knowledge of ~eir truth.' " He continues: "This is probably the rule in this
state in situations where no privity of contract exists despite general statements in more
recent cases that scienter is immaterial." The Michigan court, in Bahlman v. Hudson
Motor Car Co., z90 Mich. 683 at 694, 288 N. W. 309 (1939), refers to the manufacturer's "deliberate false statements" when speaking of the Baxter case.
19 XS CoRN. L. Q. 445 at 448 (1933). The author suggests that "It is not
clear from the facts whether the car 1iad shatter-proof glass defectively constructed or
merely ordinary glass negligently placed in the car." It seems quite clear that neither
assumption was true and that, in any event, neither would have to be true to involve.
liability under the decision of Baxter v. Ford Motor Company.
20 7 RocKY MT. L. REV. z21 (1935); DuPont v. Baridon, (C. C. A. 8th, 1934)
73 F. (2d) 26.
2 1. "Several courts • • • have recognized an exception to the general doctrine [i.e.,
requiring privity of contract in actions for breach of warranty] in the case of medicines
and foodstuffs, and have held a manufacturer to warrant to the ultimate consumer that
the article is fit for human consumption. • • • An extension was apparently recognized
in Baxter v. Ford Motor Co••••" Swan, C. J., in Rachlin v. Libbey-Owens-Ford
Glass Co., (C. C. A. 2d, 1938) 96 F. (2d) 597 at 600. See also 18 Co&N. L. Q.
445 at 450 (1933); and 46 HARV. L. REV. 161 (1932).
22 7 WASH. L. REV. 351 (193:z).
28 7 WAsH. L. Rmr. 351 at 354 (193:z). Though the writer suggests that the result
in the Baxter case might conceivably be reached by construing the advertisements as a
"continuing offer," Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co., [1893] l Q. B. 256, he
himself finds such a basis "highly artificial."
2~ 18 CoRN. L. Q. 445 at 446 (1933).
25 22 WASH. UNIV, L. Q. 406 at 4z4 (1937). The note contains an excellent and
exhaustive treatment of the manufacturer's liability on tort and warranty principles.
It concludes with the snggestien that "Extension of the doctrine of express warranty
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Su.rely the case, and the comments upon it, prove the ability of the
common law to furnish plenty of tools and devices to be used in determining liability. As to legal principles, at least, we have no "economy
of scarcity." But, when so many solutions are offered, one wonders if
there is some chink in the armour. If the case is just an action in the
nature of one for fraud and deceit, why should some legal scholar 20
labor the point to prove that it actually resembles the Carbolic Smoke
Ball case? sT If it is, in fact, nothing but an extension of the rule of
MacPherson v. Buick, why talk of express or implied warranties?
Others have already pointed out some of the difficulties inherent
in the suggested solutions. Very briefly, they must be referred to here.
Usually, in cases involving fraud and deceit, the injury sustained
is to the pocketbook, rather than to the person.28 For physical injuries,
even those resulting from misrepresentations, we have available the
concepts of battery and negligence.29 Again, in many jurisdictions, the
defendant, in a deceit action, must be guilty of an intentional misstatement; in others the statement must, at least, have been negligently
made. So also, in deceit cases, the plaintiff must ha.ve relied upon a
misrepresentation, changed his position, and suffered an injury because,
of that change. Can the plaintiff, in a case like the Baxter case, show
a reliance of this sort? Did he change his position in such fashion as to
subject himself to new risks of physical injury? Did the injury, in any
fair sense, result from-was it caused by-the representation made by
the defendant? One might imagine a plaintiff who could truthfully
say "I have studiously refrained from riding in an automobile because
of my fear of breaking glass; I read your ad and decided I could now
safely ride in a. motor car," or "I never drove on gravel roads, because
0£ my fear, etc.; your advertisements caused me to change this habit,"
or "I had decided to give up riding in automobiles; the old car was
put away for good; your ad, etc., etc." But, in the absence of some
is the solution to the problems raised by modem day advertising." Harper and McNeeley, "A Synthesis of the Law of Misrepresentation," zz Mnm. L. REv. 938 at 969
(1930), apparently regard it as a case of innocent misrepresentation.
211 7 WASH. L. REV. 351 at 354 (1932).
ST Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co., [1893] l Q. B. 256.
28 ''The action of deceit was first maintained, and is still most often brought,
where the defendant's misrepresentation of fact has misled the plaintiff into some venture which concerns his commercial, financial, or economic advantage." Bohlen, "Misrepresentation as Deceit, Negligence, or Warranty," 42 HARv. L, REV. 733 (1929),
211 ''The hurts to interests of ,per.rondity which are brought about through deception are classified as batteries, false imprisonments, malpractice, and as negligence."
Green, "Deceit," 16 VA. L. REV. 74-9 (1930).
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such allegation, just how has the plaintiff changed his position for the
worse, so far as physical injuries are concerned? 30
To get this case in under the rule of 1,,1.acPherson v. Buick Motor_
Company 31 the distinguished author of that rule would have required
a showing of negligence in the manufacture of the article; he would,
in addition, have required the court to find that the defective article
was "a thing of danger." Probability of harm, not the possibility thereof,
he so carefully pointed out,32 was required. Would the sale of an automobile equipped with a well-made, old-fashioned glass windshield
have called for liability, in the absence of a statute requiring the use
of safety glass?
The application of the so-called contractual warranty principles
( as opposed to the "tort-on-warranty" theory, to be discussed later)
would seem to require privity of contract. To apply the principle of the
Carbolic Smoke Ball 88 case it would be necessary to find an intent to
contract on the part of both the Ford Motor Company and the purchaser.
Perhaps this is a case of negligent advertising, negligent language;
a case like Cunningham v. Pease House Furnishing Company.3 4, In
that case, the defendant, a retailer, sold a can of stove blacking to
plaintiff's mother, representing that this blacking, unlike others on
the market, could be usep. safely while the stove was hot. Plaintiff was
injured when the blacking, used as directed, exploded. The New
Hampshire court, in allowing recovery, answered defendant's argument, to the effect that it could be liable only if guilty of making an
intentional false statement, saying
"In this state, a person who acts upon a false representation made
for the purpose of inducing him to change his position may recover
the damages he sustains in an action of deceit when the maker
knew it to be false, and in an action of negligence when he ought
to have known it to be so." 35
so There is no denial of the fact that the purchaser has bought an article of less
value; our problem is directed to his recovery for physical injuries. As stated by one
writer, "the measure of damages in most cases would be but the price of the defective
article." 7 WAsH. L. REV. 351 at 359, note 41 (1932).
31 217 N. Y. 382, III N. E. xo50 (1916).
32 Cardozo, in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., zr7 l'T. Y. 38z at 389, II N. E.
IOSO (1916): "There must be knowledge of a danger, notµierely possible, but probable.
It is po,sible to use almost everything in a way that will make it dangerous if defective."
ss Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co., [1893] I Q. B. 256.
Sf. Cunningham v. Pease House Furnishing Co., 74 N. H. 435, 69 A. 120
(1908).
35 lbid., 74 N. H. 435 at 437 (italics added).
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Cunningham, v. Pease was decided in I 908; is it possible that, in reality,
the Washington court, while not citing the Cunningham, case, was following its theory? Was this a case which involved the second of the
two situations suggested by the New Hampshire court? Unfortunately,
even if we could :find a real change of position, similar to that involved
in the stove blacking case, there is no suggestion, in the Ba:ctsr case,
that Ford Motor Company should have known that the windshield
would shatter. And it is one thing to be injured when you have changed
your habits about blacking a stove when it is cold; and quite another
to drive a car in the customary manner, and in the same places and
on the same sort of roads, with no increase of risk.
We seem to be left with the argument that, as an action on a warranty was, in its origin, tortious in nature, a decision like that in Baxter
v. Ford 1'.1otor Company is sound because the court is simply going
back to familiar first principles in finding tort liability on these facts.
We may admit that an action upon a warranty was, in early days, of
a tortious nature.86 The suggestion that this fact justifies the imposition
of liability today, in a case like the Baxter case, gives us pause for several reasons.
In the first place, is it not just as true that, in origin, the simple
contract action was tortious in nature? Despite the fact that the "Law
of Contract originated from an action upon the case that was closely
akin to a remedy in tort," 31 we would all be somewhat surprised, today,
now that the great body of contract law has developed,38 to :find ourselves justifying some unusual decision in a contract case by saying,
"In origin, contract actions were tortious in nature; therefore, on tort
principles, though contrary to contract principles, this result is explainable."
But, more important, the suggestion that the decision in the Baxter
case may be justified as a proper application of tort-on-warranty principles, because, in early days, the warranty action was tortious in nature,
or quasi-tortious at least, overlooks the fact that we are explaining a
modern, twentieth-century decision by reference to early principles,
when those very principles are no longer applied in the torts :field.
88 WJLL1STON, SALES, zd ed., § 195, "Early Law of Warranty" (1934-): ''The
action ,vas thus conceived of at the outset as an action of tort."
BT WINFIELD, A TEXT BooK OF THE LAw OF ToR.T 4 (1937).
88 "Thus freed entirely from its early restrictions, the Action of Assumpsit took
its place in the legal armoury as the typical action of contract; though, as ,ve have seen,
it was, historically, an action founded on tort. Thus it became possible, also, to classify
personal actions into actions of Contract and actions of Tort." ComGAN, CASES ON THE
LAw oF CoNTRACTS 7 (1921).

974

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38

They, too, have changed. It would be threshing out old straw to do
more than suggest that, in those early days, tort liability was practically
liability without fault. Defendant acted; plaintiff was hurt as a result
0£ that action; defendant was liable. But we have gone. a long way, in
the torts field, since the days of the anonymous case in which liability
was so imposed.39 'foday, as a usual thing, tort liability is based upon
fault.
Again, we may admit that the action on warranty was originally
quasi-tortious in nature. It would still be perfectly proper, would it
not, for a court to construe such warranties as these--representations
contained in billboard and magazine advertising, or even in sales literature,-as warranties of freedom from discoverable defects? "0 After all,
these representations must be construed, and there would be no insuperable barrier to a construction which held a manufacturer for discoverable defects, yet relieved hitn in the event that he had used reasonable
care.
IV
THE BASES OF TORT LIABILITY

But labels are relatively unimportant. It seems useless to spend
time justifying a certain decision on this or that theory, if the result
is indefensible, or doubtful, as a matter of social policy. We have seen
fit to apply certain fundamental principles in cases involving the possibility of tort liability. It would appear that we should test the Baxter
case in the light of those basic principles, and then test the result
reached by the application of those principles.
Two possible bases for tort liability suggest themselves: fault, and
risk. We do not hold defendants liable, in tort actions, generally, unless
they have been guilty of some fault. We may not mean, when we speak
of "fault," moral blameworthiness; the actor may have intended no
harm, nor any invasion of plaintiff's protected interests; he may have
89 Anonymous, Year Book 6 Edward IV, pl. iS (Common Pleas, 1466), extracted
by BoHLEN, CAsES ON THE LAW OF ToRTS, 3d ed., 130 (1930).
" 0 "The question is, what, in such a contract, is the implied undertaking of the
seller as to the efficiency of the pole? Is it an absolute warranty that the pole shall be
reasonably fit for the purpose, or is it only partially to that effect, limited to defects
which might be discovered by care and skill?" Brett, J. A., in Randall v. Newson, 2
Q. B. D. 102 at 105 (1876). The limitation as to latent defects which had been
recognized in Readhead v. Midland Ry., L. R. 4 Q. B. 379 (1869), was held not to
apply to the sale of a chattel; the plaintiff and defendant, in Randall v. Newson, were
in privity. But, the warranty, of fitness for a specific purpose, had to be construed.
Blackbum and Lush, JJ., had so construed it as not to cover latent defects which care
and skill could not discover.
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merely fallen a little short of our required standard of care; but he
has been, at least, negligent and therefore culpable. Had the Ford
Motor Company made an intentional misstatement, or even a negligent
one; or had it manufactured, purposely, a shatterable "shatter-proof''
windshield, or negligently done so, the Baxter case would have been
entirely different.4°a But, as decided, the result of the case is to impose
absolute liability. We have other instances, of course, of liability without fault. But, in the main, common-law liability is not so determined.
And when a case does impose such liability we find ourselves explaining
or justifying liability. A court may use the "sic utere" maxim/1 in such
a case, though in another apparently similar, it has declared that the
maxim is not an absolute one, and has denied liability because its imposition would constitute an unreasonable burden, or an unreasonable
restriction of defendant's rights.42 We speak of "extra-hazardous" undertakings, or stress the "utility of the risk," when we find a decision
like that in Green v. General Petroleum Company.43 We must frankly
realize that the Baxter case is just another of those rather rare instances
in which common-law liability is imposed in the absence of faultanother case to be added to that short list of which Fletcher v. Rylands44 and the Green 45 case are examples. This is all well and good,
provided the result is desirable when tested by its probable results, and
4 oa. Different, that is, in so far as defendant's culpability was concerned. Problems
of causation, reliance, or change of position, and those involving policy factors still
remain.
'
41 Green v. General Petroleum Corp., 205 Cal. 328 at 333, 270 P. 952 (1928).
"The present case ••• presents a situation to which the doctrine of sic utere ttl() ue
alienum mm laeda1 may be applied in its bx:oad and fundamental import." The case
involved the non-negligent blowing out of defendant's oil well with resulting damages
to plaintiff's adjoining property.
42 Hoffman v. Tuolumne County Water Co., IO Cal. 413 at 417 (1858), quoted
with approval in Sutliff v. Sweetwater Water Co., 182 Cal. 34 at 38, 186 P. 766
( I 920) : "The general rule is, that every man may do as he chooses with his own
property, provided he does not injure another's. But there is another rule as well
established, which is, that a man must so use his own property as not to injure his
neighbor's. The last rule, however, does not make a man responsible for every injury
which may arise to another from the use which the first may make of his property.
It would be an intolerable hardship to hold a man responsible for unavoidable accidents
which m'ay occur to his property by fires or casualties, or acts beyond his control, though
others are likewise injured."
43 Carpenter, "The Doctrine of Green v. General Petroleum Corporation," 5 So.
CAL. L. REV. 263 (1932).
44 3 Hurl. & Colt. 774, 34 L. J. Ex. 177, 159 Eng. Rep. 737 (1865), reversed
4- Hurl. & Colt. 263, 35 L. J. Ex. 154 (1886), latter decision affd. L. R. 3 H. L.
330 (1868).
" 5 Green v. General Petroleum Co., 205 Cal. 328, 270 P. 952 (1928).
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when tested by results in other cases involving risks of a similar nature.
We come, then, to that other usual justification for tort liability, the
risk created by defendant's acts. And, generally, we require, for liability, the creation of an unreasonable risk. It has been suggested that
instances of liability without fault obviously presuppose an absence of
unreasonable risk; that the imposition of such liability rests upon
grounds that are purely "socionomic"; and that, while the risks created
are reasonable, because of the "social utility and community benefits of
the enterprise, nevertheless, such social benefits ••• may not be created at
the risk" of those who may, sometimes accidentally, be in the danger
zone.46 We actually legislate against the most risky of activities; such
activities may involve even criminal liability. Liability for negligent acts
and liability without fault suggest that, actually, while we do not see
fit to prohibit or condemn the activity, we do say to the actor, in both
cases, "Such acts are done at your peril." And if "social utility" suggests
that the risk. involved in the enterprise is not unreasonable, but social
policy suggests that liability shall follow injuries resulting therefrom,
then, from the standpoint of society, was not the unusual risk created
an unreasonable one? In the light of these policy factors, does the defendant's conduct, in the Baxter case, suggest that he has created an
unreasonable risk, or such an unusual risk as would justify the imposition of liability?
May we consider, first, the steps which a defendant must take to
avoid future liability? What would you advise this defendant to do?
Suppose you told him that he could go back to the old-fashioned type
of windshield, and he decided to do so. What result? I think we may
safely assume that the use of laminated glass in windshields has cut
down the risk of injuries from flying glass by ninety-nine per cent.
Where, with the older type of glass, thousands of persons were subjected to the risk of injury from flying fragments, at the most, tens
would be so subjected if the new type is used. We have, then, this
rather absurd result: if the motor car manufacturer continues to supply
us with cars which are equipped with the more dangerous windshields,
he is not liable; for, in that case, our liability basis is the normal one46 HARPER, TOR.TS 15 (1933): "Liability 'without fault,' as it were, is imposed
upon grounds which are purely socionomic, upon the theory that one who so conducts
himself as to create certain unusual risks toward others, for his own advantage, should do
so at his peril as the price of his social privilege of carrying on the dangerous activity."
(Italics added.) Earlier in the paragraph the author had referred to the third type
of conduct upon which tort liability may be predicated as "conduct which is extrahazardous although neither intended to invade the interests of others nor negligent
with respect to those interests."
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fault. If, however, he supplies us with a less risky contrivance, but brags
a little too much about it, he is absolutely liable.
But perhaps you would advise him to "tone down'' his advertising
and continue to use the new laminated glass; after all, a legislature may
require it/1 or competition may indicate such action. What, then, of his
liability? By simply changing the words in his ad, by speaking of
"safety glass" instead of "shatter-proof," or by suggesting that his new
glass will "reduce," instead of "eliminate," the chance- of flying-glass
injuries, he will probably avoid liability. Mind you, he puts the same
product on the market; there is just as much risk as before; you and
I take the same chances of injury; and we would, without doubt, react
the same if a flying pebble should hit our windshield. But by the use
of just those few words the risk has become "reasonable"; such a
"social benefit" may be created at the risk of the plaintiff accidentally
in the danger zone.
Or, looking at it in just a little different light: Assume that car
maker A, during the year of the Baxter accident, had placed roo,ooo
cars on the market, all equipped with laminated glass shields, while
his compet;itor, B, had sold roo,ooo cars equipped with the older, more
dangerous type. Assume, further, that we are correct when we guess
that the laminated glass reduces the chance of injury by ninety-nine per
cent. The Baxter result would mean that B, who has subjected, say,
one hundred of us to the risk of injury, will be free from liability;
his liability is determined by fault. A, the man who subjected, on the
same basis, only one of us to injury-but who told us that the glass was
"shatter-proof"-is liable for the unexpected injury. Liability for the
more unexpected; no liability for the more-to-be-expected. It seems
rather odd that we should penalize the man who creates little risk,
and prefer the man whose activity was bound to create more.
These practical results of the application of the rule of the Baxter
case would seem to show that the conclusion is not based upon the
unreasonableness of the risk created by the defendant. Nor would
there seem to be any social gain to offset these rather unusual practical
results. Viewed from the angle of social utility, the Baxter case does
not seem to offer us much promise. The risk to the public will not
necessarily be lessened, when liability may be avoided so easily, by
socially irrelevant changes of phraseology.
May we test the Baxter result in the light of liability in other familiar situations in which the normal-fault-basis is used,. or, if you
41

There is such legislation in many states.
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will, in which liability is found, or not found, upon the unreasonable
risk test. Consider the situation which arises when one is involved in an
automobile accident. Assume that about 32,000 lives are taken each
year in such accidents; 48 over a thousand times as many as would be
taken from the sale of shatter-proof glass windshields of the type
with which Mr. Baxter's car was equipped. If we find it politic to hold
the operators of automobiles liable on a fault basis, why apply absolute
liability in the Baxter case? And if the risk we all take from accidental
injuries, injuries caused by the non-negligent operation of motor cars,
is not an unreasonable one, what is there in the Baxter case which makes
it clear that the risk there created was an unreasonable one?
Just one more suggestion, along this line: It may be said that, in
the Baxter case, we have a proper business risk, one which the industry
should pay. After all, it may be said, the Ford Motor Company can
afford to pay this judgment; it wilI simply absorb this loss, or, perhaps,
pass it on to those who buy the new cars. Social policy, it may be argued,
suggests that accidental, non-negligently-produced injuries of the type
suffered by Mr. Baxter should be borne by the automobile industry, or
this particular defendant, rather than by the individual car purchaser.
If that argument is sound in this rather unusual case, it should be mor~
sound, it would seem, in a more common situation. Suppose that, in the
trans.action of its business, the Ford' Motor Company operates a hundred drive-away trucks. To conduct its normal business operations, to
distribute its product to its many dealers, it-uses its own motor trucks.
Suppose, further, that, due to no negligence on the part of Ford's drivers, several persons are hurt. Is there any suggestion that we use a
"socionomic'' basis to determine liability here? Or are we to determine
liability by the fault or risk tests? Do we hear the argument that, after
all, the distribution of cars is a component part of th,e manufacturing
process, therefore injuries resulting from distribution methods are
proper business risks, though the injuries are accidentally produced?
If fault is the proper basis for liability when we are considering the
more expectable injuries which result from the operation of Ford's
trucks, why impose absolute liability when we are dealing with the less
expectable injury of the Baxter case? Or, if the risk in the Baxter case
was an unreasonable one, why shall we treat the more probable result
as a reasonable risk which individual plaintiffs must bear? Are we not
starting at the wrong end of the line when we argue that the Baxter
case may be explained as the proper shifting of a business loss?
48 This

number is, I understand, the average for the past ten years.
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V
EXTENT TO WHICH THE BAXTER CASE

HAS

BEEN FOLLOWED

BY OTHER CouRTS

What have other courts said about the "principle" of the Baxter
case? Does the result appeal to them, as it does to many writers, as an
illustration of proper social-control? And, abandoning the fault basis,
or liability based upon the unreasonableness of the risk, do they seem
to believe that it is good social policy to hold such defendants liable?
We have so few cases, though the Baxter case was decided about eight
years ago, that our assumed figures as to the chances of injury from
this sort of experience seem, if anything, quite high.
We do have the case of Rachlin v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co.;'D
in which the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit affirmed a judgment for the defendant glass company. Plaintiff
had claimed damages on two theories: deceit, and warranty. The court
held that the term "safety glass" was not a representation of perfect
safety, but merely an assertion to the effect that the glass gave the
greatest protection available, and that this was true. Then, assuming
that defendant had consciously misrepresented the quality of its product, the court held that to establish the necessary causal connection
plaintiff would have to show that "reliance upon defendant's misrepresentations prevented her from taking other and more efficacious measures for her safety, or was the inducing cause of her being-in the car
at the time of the accident." 150 To be liable, then, the conscious misstater must have increased the risk and must have caused the plaintiff
to change her position for the worse. The court refers to the Baxter
case as an apparent extension of normal warranty rules,151 and then
points out that there was no showing that New Jersey law differs from
that of New York, and that the New York courts would not alJow
recovery in such a case. Neither on deceit, nor on warranty, principles
was this court ready to permit recovery.
Then we have the case of Chanin v. Chevrolet Motor Company/=
(C. C. A. 2d, 1938) 96 F. (2d) 597.
Ibid., 96 F. (2d} at 599·
15 1. As to privity of contract as a requisite, see note 21, supra. The court made this
statement with regard to the privity requirement: "That the orthodox role requires
privity of contract between the parties in an action for breach of warranty is too well
known to require citation of authorities. Several courts, however, have recognized an
exception to the general doctrine in the case of medicines and food stuffs••• .'' 96 F.
(2d) at 600.
152 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937) 89 F. (2d) 889.
49
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in which the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed
the order of the federal district court dismissing plaintiff's action on the
ground that, in the absence of privity, no action ex contractu would lie
in favor of the ultimate purchaser and against the remote vendor, while
an action ex delicto in the nature of an action for fraud and deceit
would require allegations of conscious misrepresentation. The court
decided that it need not consider the possibility that modern business
conditions-national advertising and the like-had resulted in direct
contractual relationship between the parties, as no such allegations were
contained in plaintiff's complaint.58
The Supreme Court of Michigan, in Curby v. Mastenbrook, 54 held
that a secondhand dealer's statements, to the effect that his "used automobiles were free from defects," and that "they would not be sold if
defective," and that his "automobiles were guaranteed for 30 days,"
were "warranties," not mere sales-talk or "puffing''; and set aside a
judgment for defendant in a case in which severe personal injuries followed when a wheel came off the used car. While the court referred to
the Baxter case, it stated clearly that it did not hold the used car dealer
as an insurer of the car he sells.
''We hold only that a dealer cannot represent a car to be in 'perfect condition' where he does not have the knowledge of the
condition which he professes, without assuming the risk of injuries proximately caused by such misrepresentation.,''
The court pointed out that "Plaintiff here was no stranger to the transaction. She furnished half of the consideration and was a party to the
agreement." 55 The case is a long way from the Baxter case, of course,
and we do not need the Baxter case to support it. Flies v. Fox Bros.
Buick Co.56 would seem to cover this case, for there, on somewhat similar facts, the dealer was held liable to a pedestrian who was injured by
the automobile sold when it was not, as represented, "in good condi53 The Baxter case was cited, in a footnote, in which the court listed "Cases that
have either expressly recognized the propriety'' of liability in actions ex contractu
in the absence of actual privity or "whose language is persuasive of the court's intention
to recognize such propriety••• !' 89 F. (2d) at 890. Interestingly enough our old
friend Thomas v. Winchester appears in that list.
H 288 Mich. 676, 286 N. W. 123 (1939). In a later Michigan case, to be discussed presently, the court said, of its decision in the Curby case, "A seller of a used
automobile is not generally under a duty to inspect or recondition the car he sells, but
he is liable for the consequences of his intentional misrepresentation of the condition
of the car." Bahlman v. Hudson Motor Car Co., 290 Mich. 683 at 695, 288 N. W.
309 (1939) (italics added).
56 Curby v. Mastenbrook, 288 Mich. 676 at 682-683, 286 N. W. 123 (1939).
56 196 Wis. 196, 218 N. W. 855 (1928).
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tion." In the FUes case, and in the Curby case, the cars were, to the
knowledge of defendant, to be taken out into traffic immediately, without any chance of inspection by the purchaser-driver. Under those
circumstances the risk would appear to be unreasonable. li7
And then, late in r939, came the case of Bahlman v. Hudson Motor
Car Company.58 Hudson had advertised that its cars were equipped
with "unisteel" tops; plaintiff purchased one of its cars; he drove it
carelessly, with the result that it turned over and plaintiff's head was
gashed when it came in contact with a seam created by welding two
pieces of steel together, at a line approximately above the driver's seat.
Here again, apparently, the motor car manufacturer had been a little
over-enthusiastic in his advertising, for he had stated, in his sales literature and advertisements:
"Safeness combined with the first bodies all of steel; bodies •.•
now brought to new heights of strength and beauty with an improved seamless steel roof. • . . A steel top which is a smooth,
solid unit with the body shell. There are no seams or joints in the
roof.•.." 159
The plaintiff alleged that he had been involved in several accidents
shortly before the purchase of this car, that he had discussed the construction of the top, and, on the strength of the salesman's assurances,
157 In Oxford v. Leathe, 165 Mass. 254-, 43 N. E. 92 {1896), the court imposed
liability upon a lessor, or licensor, in a case in which the rented premises were to be
used immediately, without any chance of inspection or repair by the tenant or licensee.
Large numbers of persons were reasonably to be expected. And, though usually, in the
absence of a covenant to repair, the occupant rather than the landlord would have been
liable to those coming into the premises, the court imposed liability on the theory that,
in such circumstances, the landlord owed persons like the plaintiff (an invitee of the
licensee) the duty to use due care in inspection and repair. In Mitchell v. Lonergan,
285 Mass. 266 at 270, 189 N. E. 39 (1934), the lessor of an automobile was held
liable to a guest of the lessee. It was said that "one shall not negligently put forth
in public places a dangerous instrumentality likely to injure third persons••••" In
reality the principle of Oxford v. Leathe was carried over in Mitchell v. Lonergan
from real property to chattel cases. Liability in the Flies case, involving a vendor of a
rebuilt automobile, could be justified either on the basis of MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Company or upon the basis of Mitchell v. Lonergan. Lessor or vendor, it would
appear, might be said to have created an unreasonable risk if he leases or sells a
defective article knowing that it will be used at once, with no chance of inspection and
repair, in traffic.
See, in this connection, the recent English case, Herschtal v. Stewart & Ardern,
Ltd., [1940] l K. B. 155, commented upon in 56 L. Q. REV. 20 (1940), where
a reconditioned car was sold to the plaintiff, who was injured when a wheel came
off. The court, and the commentator, stressed the likelihood of an examination of the
article by the purchaser.
158 290 Mich. 683, 288 N. W. 309 (1939).
159 lbid., 290 Mich. at 689.
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presumably relative to the top's construction, had purchased the car.
Chief Justice Butzel, writing the majority opinion which held defendant liable, referred to the "now famous" Baxter case. He pointed out,
quite properly, that the case was "not a simple equivalent of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company," not a case based upon negligence
but rather on the theory that a consumer "may sue a manufacturer for
deliberate false statements made to induce purchase of the product by
the consumer." He disagreed with the author of the dissenting opinion,
Justice Chandler, both on the "scope of the warranty" and the question
of "proximate cause." He suggested that the only time a purchaser
would be interested in a warranty of seamlessness would be when a car
is overturned; dismissed the "intervening force of negligence by the
customer'' as readily foreseeable; 60 and suggested that "the chain of
proximate cause was strikingly established." Where the dissenting
judges would limit the damages, in a count based on fraud and deceit
(there were three counts in this Bahlman case--negligence, breach of
warranty, and fraud and deceit), the majority opinion suggests that
damages, in a warranty action, are not so limited to "the difference
between the value of the car as sold and its value had the warranty been
true," but may include recovery for physical injuries proximately resulting £rpm the breach of the warranty. This, then, is a case in which
(I) a warranty action will lie though there is no privity of contract,
( z) the usual rule of damages is not to be applied, and (3) the negligence of the plaintiff does not bar the plaintiff from recovering, though
as the court points out, that negligence produced the overturning which
was a necessary element in making the warranty one of any importance.
It will serve no good purpose to consider all aspects of this "unisteel" case. Our discussion of the Baxter case suggests many of the
problems which confront the court when it is deciding a. case of this
sort. Nor does it follow that one must deny the validity of the result
in this Bahlman case because he questions the result in the Baxter case.
It is hard to see how such a seam could be missed in a proper inspection
of the top before complete assembly. Diligent inspection of supposedly
60 Ibid., 290 Mich. at 692. The court cites from Professor Feezer's article,
"Manufacturer's Liability for Injuries caused by his Products: Defective Automobiles,"
37 M1cH. L. REV. I at 19-23 (1938). The problem is not as simple as that in the
Baxter case, to which Mr. Feezer was referring. His comment on the Baxter case, as
far as intervening forces are concerned, was directed against the argument that the stone,
thrown up by the passing car, might be regarded as an intervening force which broke
the causal chain. A fair distinction may be made between the intervening act of the
negligent plaintiff and the intervening force of the pebble. The doctrine of contributory
negligence involves that very distinction.
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shatter-proof glass might not catch the possibility of its shattering when
a little pebble is thrown up by the wheel of a passing car as in the Baxtet"
case. Assume that neither the Ford Motor Company nor the Hudson
Motor Company consciously, or deliberately, misrepresented its product. It seems almost certain that some Hudson employee was negligent in letting these welding seams pass inspection; there is no such
certainty that there was negligence in the inspection of the Ford glass.
So, one might well decide that the risk involved in the seamy seamless
roof was unreasonable, yet that the same manufacturer would be free
from liability in the shatter-proof glass case.
There are, however, some implications in the decision of the Bahlman case which merit attention. In answering the suggestion that the
plaintiff's contributory negligence would bar his recovery, the majority
opinion refers to three cases. One, Challis 'U. Hartlojf,61 is used to support the proposition that "there is no reason or authority'' for introducing this defense in a case involving breach of warranty. It should, perhaps, be noted that the Challis case is a typical "food case" ( arsenic in
flour) ; that the tl,efendant, in that case, argued that actions on implied,
warranties are tort actions, hence the tort statute of limitations applied,
and plaintiff's cause of action was brought too late. The Kansas court
held that such actions are not tort actions, hence tort defenses were not
available. The second case mentioned, Greco v. S.S. Kresge Company,6 2
was also a food case, and the action was brought tinder the Death Act.es
The New York court states that "This action being brought as an action
to recover for death, the burden was upon the defendant to plead and
prove lack of care on the part of the deceased." The court continues:
"The inquiry here is whether the breach of the implied warranty as
alleged in the complaint • • . was a 'wrongful act, neglect, or default'
within the meaning of the statute." The answer, the court then added,
would depend entirely upon whether or not the wrong is tortious in
nature and effect. And the court concludes that it is. That is, where
the Kansas court concluded that the wrong was not tortious in nature,
and for that reason the defense of contributory negligence would not
apply, the New Yark court decided that an action to recover for physical injuries and death resulting from the breach of an implied warranty,
in a food case, was tortious in nature, but that, under their statute,
defendant had the burden of proving contributory negligence on the
part of deceased.
136 Kan. Sz3, 18 P. (zd) 199 (1933).
12 N. E. (2d) 557 (1938).
83 The interesting question as to recovery, under the Wrongful Death Acts, for
death caused by a breach of warranty is discussed in 23 Mnm. L. REV. 92 {1938).
81
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The third case referred to in the prevailing opinion, on this question
of contributory negligence as a defense, was the Baxter case. It is said
that if the defense is allowed a manufacturer could make a deliberate
false statement and escape the consequences of his misrepresentation,
in a case like the Baxter case, if the plaintiff were exceeding the speed
limit when the pebble :flew up and hit the windshield. But, does that
follow? There seems to be no suggestion of any conscious and deliberate
misrepresentation in the Baxter case. But, if there were, how would the
speed limit violation bar the plaintiff, unless, of course, the speed violation was the cause, in fact, of the injury? The mere fact that the plaintiff
was violating the law would not bar him in most jurisdictions, and certainly not in Michigan, we would assume. There must be causal connection between his speed and the injury resulting from the defendant's
misstatement. In the Baxter case the pebble was thrown up from the
gravel road by the passing car, and there is nothing to show that plaintiff's acts contributed, in any way, to cause his injury. Our concern, as
to causation, in the Baxter case, is on the other side; we find it difficult to show that defendant's words caused the physical injury. But,
in the Bahlman case, the plaintiff certainly did contribute to cause his
own injury. The presence of seams in the roof could not cause trouble
unless the car overturned-we may take the court's word for that;
but cars could overturn without any negligence on the drivers' part.
Does it follow that defendant should be liable even in the case of an
overturning caused by plaintiff's own lack of care? If the view of the
New Yark court, in the Greco case, is followed, and the action is tortious
in nature, there would be no reason to permit a contributorily negligent
plaintiff to recover. And, if we follow the Kansas court, and conclude
that the action is contractual in nature, there is still the need of interpreting the warranty. Would it not be perfectly proper so to construe it
as to make it cover situations involving accidental injuries only? In all
fairness, could we not counter the question of the majority of the Michigan court, "shall the manufacturer be permitted to escape the consequences of his misrepresentation?" with the query, "Shall the plaintiff
be allowed to escape the consequences of his negligence, when it was
his negligence which made the presence of the seams in the roof of any
material importance?"
The Michigan court suggests that "the principles of the Baxter case
have been enforced in many recent decisions," but the cases all fall in
the food group. Earlier comments in many periodicals have discussed
at length the reasons underlying· more stringent liability in the food
cases. We are again confronted, then, in a case like the. Bahlman case
with all the questions which we found inherent in the Baxter case.
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VI
CONCLUSIONS

We may differ on the questions whether, in reality, the defendant's
words caused the injuries to the plaintiff-purchaser; whether, in any
proper sense, the plaintiff has relied upon the statements of defendant,
with a resulting change of position for the worse; whether this case
does, or does not, involve an e~ress, or an implied warranty; and
whether or not such warranties are proper bases for actions e:,: contractu
ore:,: dclicto. The policy question remains: Should this defendant be
heldliable to the plaintiff, in a case of this sorti And the proper answer
to that question would seem to require us to consider the more fundamental question whether the defendant, by his acts or his words, has
created an unreasonable risk. A court which follows the Ba:-:tcr case, or
a commentator who approves the result, consciously or unconsciously,
must answer this latter question in the affirmative.
We must, of course, guard against fallacious conclusions as to the
social and economic views 64 of individual dissenting judges, or of courts
which refuse to follow the Baxter case. Rather must we recognize that
there are cases, and many of them, in which, reluctantly perhaps, when
thinking only of the injured individual plaintiff, a notoriously "liberal"
court refuses to find liability in a situation in which a generally "less
forward looking'' tribunal has imposed it. Justice Cardozo could refuse
to follow the "modern" rule 811 with regard to tort liability for injuries
resulting from defects in rented premises which a landlord had covenanted to repair, 88 or deny the liability of a water company which had,
after notice of rlle existence of a fire, failed to step up the water pressure so as to deprive the plaintiff of needed protection. er Justice Wickhem, of the usually "liberal" Wisconsin court, could refuse relief in
the event of the death of a mother who witnessed the negligent killing
of her own daughter. 08 So, too, may a court very properly decide that,
6 ' Dean Pound, in a recent article, "The Economic Interpretation and the Law
of Torts," 53 HAR.v. L. REv. 365 at 366 (1940), has pointed out the weaknesses in
the arguments of those ,vho would explain "every single decision ancl every working
out of a legal precept'' by reference alone to the "operation • • • of the desires and self
interest of an economjcally dominant class.'' The all too prevalent tendency to explain
decisions by assuming judicial predilections should give us pause.
611 This rule has been approved by the American Law Institute. 2 TOR.TS RESTATE!fENT, § 357 (1934-).
88 Cnllings v. Goetz, 256 N. Y. 287, 176 N. E. 397 (1931).
81 Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N. Y. 160, 159 N. E. 896 (1928).
88 Wanbe v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N. W. 497 (1935). Cf. Frazee v.
Western Dairy Products, 182 Wash. 578, 47 P. (2d) 1037 (1935).
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to extend liability, in a case like the Baxter case, would be an "unwarranted enlargement of the duties" of a manufacturer, even of one who
speaks in too glowing terms of his product. With perfect propriety a
court may say that the defendant's- duties "neither justly nor expediently" can be extended to cover physical injuries sustained as were
those-in the Baxter case.
I£ a court does follow the Baxter case, we may well ask: Where
next? What shall we do with the manufacturer who advertises "nonskid" tires? Or "safety" razors? For, though one· court has held that
the word "safety," when used in connection with glass, suggests no
warranty of perfection,00 another court might declare the contrary.
What about "not a cough in a carload"? Or "fire-proof'' safes? If this
doctrine really takes hold, is the radio broadcaster, who assures the
young lady listener that she will surely "get her man" if she uses X's
balm or Y's lotion, risking liability for physical injuries following the
shock of disillusionment?
As to this general :field-negligence, deceit, warranty, or whatever
the Baxter case may really involve-I take it we are feeling our way.
Differences of opinion and result are to be expected. Perhaps we are
actually witnessing the birth of a new type of tort liability. May we
hope that the established tort principles will play their proper part in
shaping the development of liability in this interesting and important
field. As to the Baxter case itself, is it not clear that it extends absolute
liability to a situation where the risk is not actually an unreasonable
one? It is, therefore, difficult to justify as a proper instrument of social
control. With the modern and now quite generally accepted extension
of liability on negligence principles in defective chattel cases, it seems
less and less necessary to impose liability in the absence of fault; especially as against a defendant who is supplying us with a less danger.ous
article than we were forced to use before the new device was available.
a9 Rachlin v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., (C. C. A. 2d, 1938) 96 F. (2d)
597.

